【摘要】在之前文章的基础之上，本文通过一些案例的对比分析来说说不可抗力条款下，想免责一方的举证责任问题。
【关键词】不可抗力、抢劫、举证责任
前篇文章提到，Parker勋爵在CIF v. Sealink一案所说的，除了合同中有不可抗力条款，一方当事人不仅要把自己置于该条款之内，而且要表明自己已经采取了一切合理的措施来避免或减轻其结果。
A party must not only bring himself within the clause but must show that he has taken all reasonable steps to avoid its operation, or mitigate its results.
那么这里的说的一切合理的措辞的批判标准是什么？试图引援不可抗力的一反是否负有举证责任？本文先从一抢劫案说起，然后再通过一些案件的简单对比介绍来说一说这方面的问题。
一、基本案情
1980年11月13日，IslanderTrucking Ltd.（以下简称“被告”）从Reggio Calabria承运J.J.Silber Ltd. and Other及Patenta G.m.b.H.and Others(以下简称“原告”)的一批货物（原告的财产）到巴黎。但在途中，运送货物的卡车被劫匪拦截，货物被劫匪劫走，原告要求被告赔偿其损失。
当事人的权利受1965年“公路货物运输法”的管辖，1949年“公路货物国际运输合同公约”拟定了相关条款，其有关规定如下：
Article 17:
1. The carrier shall beliable for the total or partial loss of the goods and for damage thereto occurring between the time when he takes over the goods and the time of delivery, as well as for any delay in delivery.
2. The carrier shall however be relieved of liability if the loss, damage or delay was caused by the wrongful act or neglect of the claimant, by the instructions of the claimant given otherwise than as the result of a wrongful act or neglect on the part ofthe carrier, by inherent vice of the goods or through circumstances which the carrier could not avoid and the consequences of which he was unable to prevent.
3. The carrier shall notbe relieved of liability by reason of the defective condition of the vehicl eused by him in order to perform the carriage, or by reason of the wrongful actor neglect of the person from whom he may have hired the vehicle or of the agents or servants of the latter.
4. Subject to article18, paragraphs 2 to 5, the carrier shall be relieved of liability when the lossor damage arises from the special risks inherent in one or more of the following circumstances . . .
Article 18:
1. The burden of proving that loss, damage or delay was due to one of the causes specified in article 17, paragraph 2, shall rest upon the carrier.
二、争议焦点
被告是一家在马耳他共和国注册成立的公司，在审判中公司的细节很少出现，但似乎是在运作一个相当小的业务。其业务包括从意大利南部到西北欧的货物运输。被告的代表或代理人Taboni先生作出了必要的安排。实际上，他似乎没有向司机详细通报情况，只是告诉他们的目的地，交出货物文件，留下他们去往意大利北部和往后的通常路线。
这批特殊货物的司机在事件发生前一年就被被告聘用，并且之前从北部到Calabria进行了多次运送。在有一次的运送途中，司机他和另一辆货车在意大利的一个加油站停下来，途中是在货车司机的驾驶室里吃饭睡觉。货车被武装和掩面的强盗进入，他被迫离开驾驶室，且车被开了一段距离，被遗弃，而货车的货物被偷走了。由于司机在几个月的时间内他的车辆被抢劫了两次，所以当地警察密切关注第二起武装抢劫案事件的情况并不奇怪。然而，他们的调查并没有导致对司机不利的任何结论，目前的原告也没有暗示说他在这些事件中的作用不是无辜的受害者。
本案中这一特殊时刻的历史始于英国南部的Reggio之旅。这已经有三天了，是离开罗马最后一次睡觉，司机最终于11月13日凌晨2点左右抵达Reggio，然后睡在装有两个铺位的货车里。大约六个小时之后，他被Taboni先生叫醒，要求他再次为法国和英国运送货物。司机不好意思地拒绝，因为他刚刚结束了长途旅行，但是Taboni先生坚持说，这批货物是非常紧急的。因此，司机最终还是同意了，于是中午或者之后不久，离开Reggio之后继续开始他的运送任务。该批货物混合物品组成，它包括立体声设备和服装，价值10万英镑以上。
尽管司机没有副司机，但他还是有一位乘客陪同，应另一名司机的要求，同意该乘客搭乘他的货车到佛罗伦萨。除了警方报告中的一些细节之外，对这名乘客知之甚少，但在审判中并没有暗示他涉及抢劫，因此他没有被当作见证人。
司机在抵达Salerno前停了两回，第一次是在距离Reggio约250公里的Castrovillari，在那里他停下来喝咖啡和零食。第二次是在68公里的LagoNegro。在这里，司机遇到了另一个被告公司的司机，他的卡车坏了。花费了一些时间（也许长达两个小时），试图修复它，司机之后又重新开始行程，并在抵达Salerno收费站之前再行进了124公里。整个旅程的天气一直不好，司机因此开始减速行驶。考虑到这一点，在途中的两站，以及他离开Reggio时的确切时间的不确定性，似乎他估计他到达Salerno收费站的时间大概是下午1030；司机说他那时候累了，不难相信他。
根据司机的证据，那么发生了什么呢？他把车停在距离收费站大约50码的地方，在一个照明良好的地方，并有车经过附近。他喝了一杯茶，他的乘客就躺在一张铺位上。大约45分钟到1个小时后，一辆卡车突然拉到靠近货车的左侧，同时驾驶室的右边的窗户被打碎了。一名带着枪的蒙面男子爬上窗户，另一名乘客打开车门，两名武装人员爬上驾驶室。劫匪拿走了司机的钥匙，问司机有多少音响。司机回答说他不知道。劫匪然后强迫司机和货车的搭乘者，将他们塞进一辆汽车里，他们在那里停留了一段时间，离现场不远，但看不见。然后他们被赶走，并在一条乡间小路上下山。他们尽快与警方联系，并多次接受询问。随后在离收费站几英里远的地方发现了这辆货车，但基本被搬空了。
根据以上这些事实，被告主张，但原告否认，这种损失是由于“公约”第17（2）条“承运人无法避免的情况”造成的。这个一般例外的解释，以及该法案中包含的具体例外。自公约第一次缔结以来，一直是一个有争议的问题。关于17（2）条，已经探讨了以下可能性：
1.承运人作为保险人承担运输过程中发生的一切损失和损害的责任，而不是在第17（2）条一部分及17（3）条具体提到的情况下。
2.如果承运人做了与实际不同的事情，承运人应承担责任，损失不会发生。
3.承运人应对所有损失负责，而不是由于不可抗力事件而发生的损失。
4.如果承运人证明他是高度谨慎的，或即使他已经高度谨慎，也会发生损失，承运人免责。
5.这一立场与刚才所说的相同，除非高度谨慎，否则应该采取合理的谨慎或恪尽职责。
1. The carrier is liableas an insurer, for all loss and damage occurring in transit, otherwise than inthe cases specifically referred to in the first part of art. 17 (2) and in art.17 (3).
2. The carrier is liable in any case where, if the carrier had done something different from what heactually did, the loss would not have occurred.
3. The carrier is liablefor all losses, otherwise than those proved to have arisen from events amounting to force majeure.
4. The carrier is exemptfrom liability if he proved either that he exercised a high degree of care, orthat the loss would have happened even if he had exercised a high degree ofcare.
5. The position is the same as just stated, save that for a high degree of care there should be substituted reasonable care or due diligence.
在审判时提出的唯一问题是被告是否免除责任，理由是损失是由于承运人无法避免的情况以及他无法预防的后果造成的。
whether Islander is relieved from liability, on the ground that the loss was caused- through circumstances which the carrier could not avoid and the consequences of which he was unable to prevent.
三、法官判决
前文的叙述是基于货车司机John Ferrugio先生（以下简称“司机”）的证据，他是审判中唯一的证人。Mustill法官接受他的叙述的大致轮廓，尽管他对事件发生的时间的回忆不能被认为是准确的。目前还没有可以确定确切历史记录的记录簿或转速仪记录，虽然司机在事件发生后的几天内向警方作了陈述，但语言有困难，不能认为这些记录是任何比口头证据更可靠，即使允许时间的流逝。但最后，Mustill法官认为这种精确度的不足实质上影响了争议的结果。
在选择这些替代性的解释，Mustill法官认为，下列原则必须适用。，同样适用于制定任何其他形式的国际公约的法规。但是，必须考虑到这样一个事实，即这些公约往往比议会法案措辞更为宽松。因此，考虑到起草者的明确意图，如果能够确定的话，是合理的；如果该公约是用不止一种语言写成的，则是指该文本的外文版本；。所有这些观点的权威可以在Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. BabcoForwarding & Shipping (
When choosing between these alternative readings, the following principles must, in my judgment, be applied. The general rules of interpretation, long established in the English Courts, are just as much applicable to a statute which enacts an international convention as to any other kind of statute. Nevertheless, accountmust be taken of the fact that such conventions tend to be more loosely worded than Acts of Parliament. It is, therefore, legitimate to have regard to the clear intention of the draftsman, if this can be ascertained; to the foreignversions of the text, if the convention was drawn up in more than one language;and to any body of decisions in foreign Courts which unequivocally prefers oneof the suggested interpretations. (Authority for all these propositions may be found in Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping (U.K.)Ltd., [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 119; [1978] A.C. 141).
不幸的是，对于公约的确切含义而言，Mustill法官认为这些允许的大多数指南在本案中并没有什么成果。因此，提到法文本并不会推进案件调查。上面列出的所有资料都与法语中使用的字符一致。同样，不可能说通过考虑文书的一般结构或以任何其他方式来确定关于公约缔约方的意图的任何明确的想法：评论者对这组文章的含义的多样性表明了这一点。参见Wijffels博士（1976年）欧洲运输法第208页；Loevre教授在同一卷的第362-4页；Rodieri，Ramberg和Glass教授的文章，同一杂志的第6,9和14页以及其他作者的作品。
Mustill法官认为同样，，但是对于在本案中应该适用的解释没有给出明确的指导。在某些情况下，事实是如此，17（2）条如何理解也没做出区别。另外一些报告太短，。其余的报告，特别是1980年3月27日Oberlandsgericht Dusseldorf关于1975年2月28日德意志联邦共和国联邦总督令的判决，及1983年6月29日奥地利Oberts Gerichtshof的判决是有用的，他们表明目前的问题是如何出现在其他司法管辖区的经验丰富的律师，，不容易驳回某些解释是站不住脚的。然而，Mustill法官认为他很满意外国的案件没有建立任何连贯的权威，。因此，Mustill法官认为通过陈述外国判定来加重这一判决是没有意义的。
因此，在这种情况下，Mustill法官认为要着重讲第17（2）条的规定，力求赋予其自然含义，同时注意避免产生荒谬结果的任何解释，或与整个“公约”的方案不一致的解释，各种可能性可能会依次查核。
Mustill法官认为没有必要浪费时间去采纳第一个建议的解释，因为它显然是与17（2）条的措辞冲突。诚然，绝对的或近乎如此的赔偿责任在运输法中并不是新鲜事：作为共同承运人的旧法律的见证。然而，这些话本身表明这不是起草者的意图。如果承运人依赖更具体的例外情况，则情况的不可避免性不是一个额外的标准：它本身就是一种除外的危险。Mustill法官不认为Hodgson法官在Michael Galley Footwear Ltd. v Iaboni, [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 251案中的判决有相反的效果。博学的法官不可能一直在考虑绝对的责任，否则他不会提到武装抢劫是承运人不负责任的情况。当说这些条款不涉及过错的时候，Mustill法官认为有见识的法官对于自己有过错，是因为没有达到合理的谨慎标准，并不是要表达对承运人应该做什么和可以做什么的考虑完全放一边。
No time need be taken up with the first of the suggested readings, since it is manifestly in conflict with the words of art. 17 (2). It is true that aliability which is absolute, or nearly so, would be no novelty in the law of carriage: as witness the old law on common carriers. The words themselves, however,show that this was not the intention of the draftsman. The unavoidability of the circumstances is not an extra criterion to be satisfied if the carrier is to rely on the more specific exceptions: it constitutes an excepted peril in its own right.
Mustill法官认为第二种解释是不反对的。恰恰相反，因为它最符合词的字面意思。如果承运人能做的事情导致损失没有发生，损失就是承运人“可以”避免的损失。尽管如此，这个理解也可以被放弃，因为这会导致荒谬的。想象一下，由于雷击，路边无法预料的爆炸，或由于第三方的行动而造成的空前的重大道路交通事故，一辆车被毁坏了。在这些和类似的情况下，承运人“可以”通过提早15分钟开始旅程的机会或通过选择不同的路线来避免损失。确实很难想象运营商无法避免的任何伤亡事故，从这个意义上说，如果不以这种方式来理解这个例外情况，那么会使内容变得空洞。问题在于“避免”这个词有两个不同的含义。一个可以说是被动的。由于与自己的努力无关的原因，这个人从一个不受欢迎的偶然事件中摆脱出来：例如，如果他有幸在发生车祸时“避免”伤害。另一种意思是指人们正在采取积极的步骤（成功地），正是为了防止所面临的危险。后一种解释它一定是第17（2）条所要承担的意思。这个例外考虑到承运人不能做任何事情，或者做任何事情，意图和防止实际发生的类型的损失。
The second interpretation is not open to this objection. Quite the contrary, for it best fits the literal meaning of the words. If there is something which the carrier could have done which would have led to the result that the loss did not occur,the loss was one which the carrier "could have" avoided. Nevertheless,this reading can also be rejected with confidence, for it leads to anabsurdity. Imagine a vehicle destroyed by lightning-stroke, or by an unforeseeable explosion at the roadside, or by an unprecedented major road accident, brought about entirely by the actions of third parties. In these and similar cases, the carrier "could have" avoided the loss by the chance of starting the journey 15 minutes earlier or later, or by choosing a different route. It indeed is hard to imagine any casualty which the carrier could not have avoided, in this sense, yet to read the exception in this way would leave it empty of content. The problem is that the word "avoid" has two different senses. One is, so to speak, passive in nature. The person escapes from an unwelcome contingency for reasons unconnected with his own efforts: for example, if he is fortunate enough to "avoid" injury,when involved in a motor accident. The other sense signifies the taking of active steps, which the person embarks upon (successfully in the event) precisely with the object of forestalling the peril in question. It must surely be thislatter meaning which the expression is intended to bear in art. 17 (2). The exception contemplates that the carrier could not have done anything, orabstained from doing anything, with the intention and with the effect of preventing a loss of the type which actually occurred.
但是，Mustill法官认为这只是一个部分的解决办法。它赋予了“避免”这个词的意思，但却留下了“可能”的意义。在这里，又是一个荒谬的风险。如果拥有无限的远见和资源，承运人可以避免的危险有很多。如果承运人使用一辆被几十名武装警卫包围的装甲车辆，则可以防止持械抢劫。然而，“公约”缔约方可能已经意图迫使承运人采取极端的措施，以避免由于他自己造成的事件承担责任。必须限制承运人“可以”做的事情，但在什么程度上？
This is,however, only a partial solution. It gives meaning to the word "avoided" but leaves open the significance of "could have".Here, again, there is a risk of absurdity. There are many perils which acarrier could avoid, if endowed with unlimited foresight and resources. An armed robbery can be prevented, if the carrier employs an armoured vehicle,surrounded by scores of armed guards. Yet the parties to the Convention canscarely have intended to force the carrier to such extreme measures, in orderto avoid liability for events not of his own making. Some limit must be placed on what the carrier "could have" done. But at what level?
Mustill法官认为一种可能性是通过参照“不可抗力”或“上帝的行为”的概念来限定责任。这已经吸引了一些法官和评论员，但是他不能接受，主要有两个原因。首先，无论这些表述可能涉及什么，它们都涉及外部事件，而例外的措辞则要求注意力集中在承运人的作为或不作为上。其次，如果起草者打算给予与不可抗力相同的豁免，那他没有理由不这样说。事实上，在文献中可以发现，这个国际文书的起草人有意识地放弃了使用法案的术语，因为在某些法律制度中，某种表达方式可能不为人所知，而在另一些国家其意义可能不清楚。尽管如此，起草者可以使用简单的方法来达到所提出的结果，及选择不适用它们。
Onepossibility is to qualify the liability by reference to the concepts of "force majeure" or "Act of God". This has appealed to somejudges and commentators, but I cannot myself accept it, essentially for two reasons. In the first place, whatever exactly these expressions may involve, they are all concerned with extraneous events, whereas the words of the exceptions require that attention is focussed on the acts or omissions of the carrier. Secondly, if the draftsman had intended to confer an exemption co-extensive with that of (say) force majeure there is no reason why he should not have said so explicitly.Indeed, there may well be force in the suggestion, to be found in the literature, that the draftsman of this international instrument had consciously abstained from employing terms of art, because in some legal systems aparticular expression might not be known, and in others its significance mightbe unclear. Be that as it may, the draftsman had at his disposal simple meansof achieving the suggested results, and chose not to use them.
基于类似的原因，Mustill法官将拒绝，如Hodgson法官在Michael Galley v. Iaboni案和Neill法官在ThermoEngineers Ltd. and Another v. Ferrymasters Ltd., [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 200案中，关于合理谨慎的标准，并且承运人的责任应该与普通法下的英格兰法律相等同的论点。如果起草人想要达到这个结果，他可以借用海牙规则的“恪尽职责”，或者可以使用诸如“谨慎”或“疏忽”这样的措辞-这正是他所做的，仅仅是前两行，在第17（2）条创造的另一个例外的情况。
Fo rsimilar reasons, I would reject, as did Mr. Justice Hodgson in Michael Galleyv. Iaboni and Mr. Justice Neill in Thermo Engineers Ltd. and Another v.Ferrymasters Ltd., [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 200; [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1470, the contention that the standard set is one of reasonable care, and that the carrier's liability is to be equated with what it would be, at common law,under the law of England. If the draftsman had intended this result, he could have borrowed "due diligence" from the Hague Rules, or could have used words such as "care" or "neglect" - which is exactly what he did do, a mere two lines previously, in the context of another one of the exceptions created by art. 17 (2).
然而，可以反对的是，无论如何，Mustill法官认为从思想的角度来看，在第17（2）条下很难从调查中免除谨慎的义务。更多的合理性概念再次回到了原点。从某种意义上说，这是事实。必须找到一些标准来消除这种荒谬的情况，这种荒谬可能导致承运人对于起草者所无法想象的失败负有责任。当发货人抱怨没有一些预防措施的时候，承运人可以合法地回答：“但是这是非常荒谬的”。很难用一个单词或几个词来充分表达这个概念。不过，这个主意是否以“可行”，“切实可行”或“明智”等字眼来正面表达，或以“荒谬”或类似的方式来否定地表达，理性的诉求是不能排除的。因此，，自然而然地发现，提供一个可行的谨慎责任，即通过商定译文“合理地”提出的一个词来定义。德语的表述是“vernünfigerweise zumutbarersorgfalt”。但是，这并不意味着英国的律师有条件尽量通过暗示合理的条件来填补合同的空白，并且参照合理的人的标准来制定规范，。相反，这个想法是排除一个完全不合理的预防措施：不要设定一个可以与普通法谨慎义务等同的标准。
因此，Mustill法官认为第17（2）条规定了一个标准，一方面要求在法律范围内采取一切可能的预防措施，尽管这种措施是极端的，另一方面按照目前的审慎做法，合理行事。要确定标准所在的位置，以及如何用措辞表达，是一个更困难的问题。最后，Mustill法官得出结论：把“不可避免”这个词作为“即使极度谨慎”的补充，也是最好的表达。在判断这个标准是否在个别情况下得到满足时，，而不仅仅是在刑法可能对妨碍损失的步骤施加任何限制的情况下。在Mustill法官看来，在适当情况下，可能包括建议预防措施的财务可行性。因此需取得一些平衡，与Hodgson法官正确驳回的“过失公式”（Mustill法官的尊重意见）是完全不同的平衡。
Thus, I conclude that art. 17 (2) sets a standard which is somewhere between, on the one hand, a requirement to take every conceivable precaution, however extreme, within the limits of the law, and onthe other hand a duty to do no more than act reasonably in accordance with prudent current practice.To decide just where the standard is located, and how to express it in words,is a more difficult problem. In the end, I have come to the conclusion that the concept is best expressed by treating the words "could not avoid" as comprising the rider "even with the utmost care". In deciding whether this criterion is satisfied in the individual case, the Court will need to lookat all the circumstances, and not simply at any constraints which may be imposed by the criminal law on steps which would have prevented the loss. The circumstances could, as it seems to me, in an appropriate case, include the financial practicability of the suggested precautions. Some balance will therefore have to be struck; but it is a very different balance from the "negligence equation" referred to and (in my respectful opinion)rightly rejected by Mr. Justice Hodgson.
Mustill法官认为必须提出另外一个解释问题，即在第18条之下反向举证的方式应该被应用。在他看来，这个立场如下：承运人不需要列出所有可能被认为适当的步骤，然后逐一有条不紊地表明，即使是要求极其小心也不要求承运人，或者如果这些措施已经被采取了，但这并没有什么区别。相反，原告人提出（虽然不能证明）承运人应该做什么，如果可以的话，承运人是否可以反驳提出的具体指控。
In my judgment, the position is as follows. The carrier is not required to formulate a list of all the steps which could conceivably have been thought appropriate, and then methodically demonstrate,one by one, either that they were not called for even by a requirement of the utmost care, or that, if they had been taken, it would have made no difference. Instead, it is for the plaintiff to suggest (although not to prove) what the carrier ought to have done, and itis then for the carrier to rebut, if he can, the specific complaints thus put forward.
在这个背景下，Mustill法官回到本案的情况。这些原则很难应用于事实，因为双方都有相当多的证据。即使在这个问题是简单疏忽的情况下，也可以期待承运人挺身而出，说明自己的作为和不作为：在本案的情况下标准好高。然而，正如它所发生的那样，没有任何来自被告管理层或其意大利的代理被要求提供证据。Mustill法官认为不知道他们是否曾考虑保护委托他们承运的货物，是否改变了惯例，还是考虑改变惯例？是否考虑过原告所应采取的特别预防措施；并特别针对车辆自动防盗报警装置，如何及何时进行测试和维护，以及是否发现被篡改。司机的证据，就目前而言，并不表明被告关心抢劫的风险，而不是他们在欧洲联盟条例下的义务，他们的司机没有超过驾驶时间和距离的限制。这些证据不足以说明缺席被视为无法照顾的预防措施的实用性和实用性。原告本身根本没有提供任何证据，并且根据“民事证据法”满足了两条通知，将他们的律师与Saleno附近的两个货车停车场的所有者进行电话交谈的实质内容。被告确实打电话给一位专家证人，该证人在他的经验范围内对事情有授权。不幸的是，由于他对意大利的条件和做法没有第一手的了解，所以他对现在的争端表示了他的看法。他也没有被要求去参观抢劫现场或邻近的道路，也没有去“民事证据法”通知中提到的货车停车场。
在这种情况下，Mustill法官认为如果案件的重要部分几乎完全是空白，那么就很容易得出结论：被告未能证明行使任何谨慎，更不用说极为谨慎，然后继续专注于这个问题的因果关系。在Mustill法官看来，这不是正确的做法。，自问自己是否有可能采取的预防措施，受特殊限制约束它们必须是：（i）不超越常识范围，（ii）不违法 及（iii）不明显无用。只有在这个问题得到肯定的答复的情况下，，这涉及到承运人本应采取的预防措施实际上是否会阻止这种特殊的损失。
In these circumstances, where important parts of the case are an almost complete blank,it is tempting to conclude that the defendants have failed to prove the exercise of any care, far less the utmost care, and then to go on to concentrate on the issue of causation. To my mind, this is not the correct approach. The Court must first do the best itcan, to ask itself whether there were precautions which could have been taken,subject to the constraints that they must have been: (i) not extravagant beyond the bounds of common sense, (ii) not illegal, and (iii) not obviously useless.It is only if this question is answered in the affirmative, that the Court is required to enter upon the issue of causation, which is concerned with whethera precaution which the carrier ought to have adopted would in fact have prevented this particular loss.
Mustill法官现在谈谈原告所声称的个人抗辩。首先是提供安全装置，即声音报警，内部锁和延迟动作燃料切断。对于防盗报警，情况是这样：司机的证据是，安装了一个警报，并且（如果法官正确地理解了他的证据），他在收费站停车的时候被打开了。他还提供了证据，证明抢劫正在进行中，他听到的声音表明货车门被强行打开。如果真的发生了这种情况，并且如果警报被激活并且处于正常工作状态，则应该响起来：但事实并非如此。司机还说，劫匪一进门就把钥匙拿了出来，这些无疑也被用来关掉警报。但他们也可以用来打开货车的门，这使得劫匪他们有风险不太可能在收费站附近闯入。Mustill法官认为这里有一个 他不能解决的矛盾，但即使考虑到被告的举证，他也不认为这是致命的。车辆被开走的事实表明，货物的搬运并没有在收费站进行。鉴于劫匪拥有钥匙，Mustill法官认为盗窃报警（如有瑕疵）的任何缺陷并不是造成货物最终损失的近因。
There is a discrepancy here which I cannot resolve but, even allowing for the burden on the defendants, I do not regard it as fatal. The fact that the vehicles was driven away shows that the removal of the goods was not carried out at the tollgate. Given that the robbers were in possession of the keys, I consider that any defect in the burglar alarm (if there was a defect) was not the proximate cause of the ultimate loss of the goods.
原告还辩称，驾驶室本应装有某种形式的内部锁，比司机在休息时所用的锁扣更为精巧。Mustill法官认为，这个争辩没有任何东西。第一个强盗的一只手在驾驶室里，另一只手持枪。只需要几秒钟就可以打开车门，或者让司机自己做。同样，人们可能会忽视手动报警的想法。在可能出现麻烦的情况下，这可能是有用的，但是期望司机激活它，希望收费员能够注意到这个声音，但这个时候他被武装人员吓呆了。
同样的意见也适用于司机可能被劫匪吓呆时操作切断燃油的建议。然而，通过替代方法，如果车辆在停泊时立即开启切断，驾驶员在受到威胁时不需要采取积极措施。这是事实，但在Mustill法官看来并不具有实际意义，因为（a）车辆似乎在被抛弃之前似乎没有被开走太远的距离，所以在切断运作之前可以很好地完成移走货物及（b）劫匪抢劫后，劫匪既劫持了司机又拥有钥匙，而且如果切断造成了不利后果，Mustill法官不怀疑他们可以为此作一些努力。
基于这些理由，Mustill法官认为被告已经反驳了涉及使用保护装置的原告部分的抗辩，下一批指控涉及路程的规划。原告认为被告应该（a）派遣两名司机跟随车辆，（b）提供司机接力或（c）安排卡车在车队前行。
For these reasons I hold that the defendants have rebutted that part of the plaintiffs' case which relates to the use of protective devices. The next group of allegations relates to the planning of the journey. It is said that the defendants should have either (a) sent two drivers with the vehicle, (b)provided a relay of drivers or (c) arranged for the truck to travel in convoy.
至于聘用两名司机的可能性，Mustill法官认为并不是说他们在驾驶室内的存在会使劫匪逃走；事实证明抢劫是成功的，尽管有一名乘客被带走，这是正确的。也没有人认为货车可能被直接送到目的地，因为在欧洲联盟条例下这是非法的。被告对非法行为毫不在意的事实没有任何意见。被告对于没有做到违法行为的，他们不承担责任。原告所争辩的是，两名司机可以更加灵活地规划路线，以便在安全的地方安排主要的停车休息。
Mustill法官认为这里的问题是：1.除了那不勒斯附近的依民事证据法通告的之外，在两名司机的法定限制范围内没有证据证明安全地点。司机似乎在罗马习惯性地睡觉，但他也说在佛罗伦萨和米兰南部没有推荐的货车停车场。也许有一些，他不知道，但没有证据。2.常识表明，即使是两个司机也不能使车辆长时间保持运转。他们需要下拉伸腿，放松自己，恢复注意力。原告没有提出相反的证据。因此，除了最短的行程之外，还会有一些停顿，还有一些暴露在抢劫中。试图修理其他车辆的漫长等待仍然会发生，虽然第一站茶点（通过没发生事故）可能已经缩短。另外，如果被告这样安排，司机可以在Salerno附近的两个封闭区域之一停下来休息，而不是停在收费站门口。Mustill法官认为，按照他的判断，仅仅是更灵活的路线规划这一事实本身不能阻止损失。
Mustill法官认为可以更简单地谈谈有关在车队行驶的建议。据司机说，他被告知运输很紧急。由于没有被告或其代理人的证据，Mustill法官他认为无从知道这是多么紧迫；是否考虑了车队的可能性；或在短时间内将车辆安排加入车队是否切实可行。相反，双方都没有任何意见，尤其是从原告那里得到的建议是否意味着意大利的道路运输公司是否有可能构成车队，如果是的话，是否对发生的持械抢劫事件有明显的影响。可以回想起司机在有另一辆车陪伴时遭到抢劫。在充分重视举证责任的同时，Mustill法官认为原告要求有比原来更坚实的东西，而不是仅仅提出这个建议，没有什么可以支持的。同样的结论也适用于这样的命题：驾驶员应该在欧洲各地被雇佣接力，每个开法定八小时，然后把车辆交给另一个驾驶员。
最后，Mustill法官认为车辆应该被开到那不勒斯附近两个守卫的货车停车场。原告在这方面的一部分是他们要求Mustill法官作出的推论，即司机在收费站停车睡觉，这给劫匪提供了机会。原告指出，司机刚刚完成南行的漫长旅程，经过短暂的睡眠之后，他转身随即继续他的旅程。当他到达Salerno时，他已经在恶劣的天气中行进了10个小时，但仍然有250公里要走。司机他一定很累。虽然这是真的，但是，这不是全部。欧洲联盟条例旨在排除疲劳造成的严重危险的法规。一个谨慎的司机会找到某个地方睡觉，谨慎的雇主会让他这样做。但他们并不关心这一点。根据他的证据，司机所关心的是在路边睡觉的危险，特别是在意大利这个危险的地方，正是因为这个原因，司机的证据显示，司机决定继续到罗马，暂停休息和茶点之后。Mustill法官相信这个证据，法官发现货车没有停在Salerno，以便司机可以睡在驾驶室里
在这种情况下，原告又有以下几种申诉：（i）司机本来应该离开直达路线，要么过夜，要么在“民事证据法”通知中提到的货车停车场短暂的休息一段时间；或（ii）被告应该提供两名司机，使车辆能够在不违法的情况下被开到一个货车停车场。Mustill法官认为第一项指控可能会简单处理。尽管停车场的确切位置还没有被阐明，但他认为，任何一方的偏离都会使司机超过他上限的450公里，在每天休息期间驾驶。“欧洲联盟条例”第6条和第11条，这是违法的行为，被告不能被要求承担司机未能遵守的责任。Mustill法官认为这个结论很显然是一个讽刺。司机他已经违反了第7（2）条，如与第11和14条一起理解。他可能已经违反了第11（1）条当司机考虑南行时。一旦司机他在Salerno完成停留，当他打算前往罗马时，这会使他严重违背第6条。无论是他还是他的雇主都不关心这些违法的事情，比较而言，任何与有守卫的停车场的绕道都是微不足道的。尽管如此，Mustill法官无法认为再犯一次犯罪是一个人应该尽最大的努力去做的事。
Mustill法官认为，如果被告在这次旅程中雇佣了两名司机，情况将会有所不同。这本来是比较昂贵的，但没有提到任何实质性的材料，Mustill法官认为可以得出这样的结论，额外的花费如此荒谬，以至于超出了“最大谨慎”的范围。 如果有两名司机，则可以如此安排行程，使车辆能够在不违反规定的情况下到达其中一个货车停车场。一旦到了那里，司机们可以休息一段时间，让他们在法律范围内，也可以吃点东西，甚至可以在日常的休息时间下按照第8条进行活动。但是，原告坚持认为，由于两个原因，最大谨慎将不会涉及到停靠一个有守卫的停车场。
The position would, however, have been different if Islander had employed two drivers for this journey. This would have been more expensive, but no material was adduced from which I could have concluded that the extra expense would have been so absurdly disproportionate as to put it outside the confines of "the utmost care". If there had been two drivers the journey could have been so scheduled as to enable the vehicle to reach one of the lorry parks without any breach of the regulations. Once there, the drivers could either have taken a break long enough to keep them within the law and also to have something to eat, or perhaps even could have had their daily rest period underart. 8. It is, however, maintained that the utmost care would not have involveda call at a guarded park, for two reasons.
首先，把车辆送到停车场是没有意义的，因为这两个停车场都没有证明是针对武装强盗。对于位于Pizzola的这些停车场之一，Brown先生认为，即使在“民事证据法”通知中包含的信息中，也没有足够的安全性来使停车场值得考虑。他在这方面可能是对的，但在Pagani的另一个停车场是另一回事。据业主说，停车场被三米高的围墙所包围，晚上有灯照亮，在晚上那里有两个警卫。业主被引述说，在已经经营的10年里，所谓的“抢劫”只有两个。被告没有提出任何证据来反驳这种说法，但毫无疑问，鉴于通知迟滞，他们本可以休庭为了检查。Mustill法官认为从表面上看证据，他看不出停车场如何被描述为无用的。可能一个有决心的团伙本可以抢走停车场里的卡车，但是肯定会让事情变得更好，而当然还没有看到停车场的Brown先生已经接受了比Pizzola更值得考虑的问题。Mustill法官无法认为，一个行使最大谨慎的人可以正确地忽视停车场作为降低货物风险的手段，他也不能认为，如果车辆被开到停车场，抢劫仍然会发生。
First, itis said that there would have been no point in sending the vehicles to the park, since neither of the parks would have been proof against armed robbers.As to one of these parks, situated at Pizzola, Mr. Brown felt able to say ineffect that, even on the bare information contained in the Civil Evidence Act notice, the security cannot have been tight enough to make the park worth considering. He may well be right in this respect, but the other park at Paganiis another matter. According to the proprietor, it was surrounded by a wall three metres high. It was illuminated at night. There were two guards there at night. The proprietor is quoted as saying that there have been only two of what he called "robberies" in the 10 years during which it has been open.The defendants called no evidence to controvert this description although, no doubt, in view of the lateness of the notice, they could have had an adjournment for the purposes of inspection, if one had been applied for. Taking the evidence at its face value, I cannot see how the park could be described asuseless. Possibly a determined gang could have snatched the lorry from the park. But surely it would have made things better, and Mr. Brown, who, ofcourse, had not seen the park, was disposed to accept that it was more worthconsidering than the one at Pizzola. I find myself unable to hold that a person exercising the utmost care could properly have ignored the park as a means of reducing the risk to the goods, nor can I hold that, if the vehicle had been taken to the park, the robbery would still have taken place.
第二个观点是，如果偏离卡车停车场的话，这样会造成更大的危害，因为这样会把车辆从高速公路上驶离孤立的乡村公路。因此，司机在收费站停车是明智的。Mustill法官他赞赏Brown先生比较高速公路和其他道路的成效。另一方面，在行动中被劫持的危险，无疑不时发生，必须低于车辆静止。为了说明由于绕道的投机风险，被告应该已经放弃了货车停车场的明显好处，，卡车停车场的道路上进行了研究和停车场本身。没有这样的人提供证据，Mustill法官不准备在不存在的情况下为被告提供任何有利的认定。
The second contention is that it would have done more harm than good to deviate to the lorry park, since this would have taken the vehicle off the motorway on to isolated country roads. The driver was, therefore, wise to park at the tollgate. I appreciate the force of Mr. Brown's comparison between motorways and other roads. On the other hand, the dangers of being hijacked on the move,which undoubtedly does occur from time to time, must be less than the vehicleis at rest. In order to say that the carriers ought to have foregone theobvious benefit of the lorry park because of the speculative risks of thedetour, the Court would need to hear from someone who had studied the layby atthe tollgate, the roads to the lorry park and the park itself. No such person gave evidence andI am not prepared to make any finding in favour of the defendants in its absence.
基于这些理由，Mustill法官判被告未能提供第18条下强加在他们身上的证据，因此必须作出对原告有利的判决。
为了得出这个结论，Mustill法官不会对17（2）条进行任何解释，其与Michael Galley v. Iaboni案Hodgson法官所表达的不一致。该博学的法官在那里对无人看管的车辆的盗窃和有人驾驶的车辆的武装抢劫形成了对比。Brown先生一再强调这一区别，Mustill法官认为他始终牢记在心。Mustill法官认为，通常情况下，被告在武装抢劫案中要承担举证责任要少得多，毫无疑问，这种抢劫行为的受害者确实逃避了责任，即使是根据他对第17（2）条的解释。不过，。在这个具体的例子中，Mustill法官认为证据不足以使被告的案件好起来，正是这个原因，他认为被告他们是有责任的。
It will,in the ordinary way, be much less difficult for the defendants to satisfy the burden of proof in the case of an armed robbery, and there will, no doubt, be many cases where the victim of such a robbery does escape liability, even inthe light of the interpretation which I have placed on art. 17 (2).Nevertheless, each case must be judged on the evidence brought before the Court. In this particular instance I have found that the evidence does not suffice to make good the defendants' case, and it is for that reason that I hold them to be liable.
总结：
在本案中，被告雇佣的司机在运送货物的途中，中途停车休息的时候被强盗劫持，最终导致货物被抢劫一空，货主原告要求被告承担责任。被告认为因为强盗劫持所造成的损失属于是由于道路货物运输法中第17（2）条中“承运人无法避免的情况”造成的，因此无需承担责任，但原告不承认。原告认为被告可以采取一些预防措辞避免被强盗劫持，比如安装报警器或切断燃油装置。但在Mustill法官看来，报警器缺陷如有的话并不是造成损失的直接进因，切断燃油装置等也不具有现实意义。Mustill法官认为这些预防措施必须是：（i）不超越常识范围，（ii）不违法 及（iii）不明显无用。在不可抗力的解释上，Mustill法官认为，无论这些表述可能涉及什么，它们都涉及外部事件，而例外的措辞则要求注意力集中在承运人的作为或不作为上。其次，如果起草者打算给予与不可抗力相同的豁免，那他没有理由不这样说。
通常情况下，被告在武装抢劫案中要承担举证责任要少得多，毫无疑问，这种抢劫行为的受害者确实逃避了责任，即使是根据他对第17（2）条的解释。Mustill法官认为要着重讲第17（2）条的规定，力求赋予其自然含义，同时注意避免产生荒谬结果的任何解释。
回到17（2）条及18条描述如下：
Article 17:
2. The carrier shall however be relieved of liability if the loss, damage or delay was caused by thewrongful act or neglect of the claimant, by the instructions of the claimant given otherwise than as the result of a wrongful act or neglect on the part of the carrier, by inherent vice of the goods or through circumstances which the carrier could not avoid and the consequences of which he was unable to prevent.
Article 18:
1. The burden of proving that loss, damage or delay wasdue to one of the causes specified in article 17, paragraph 2, shall rest upon the carrier.
Mustill法官认为从思想的角度来看，在第17（2）条下很难从调查中免除谨慎的义务。第17（2）条规定了一个标准，一方面要求在法律范围内采取一切可能的预防措施，尽管这种措施是极端的，另一方面按照目前的审慎做法，合理行事。但结合全文理解，Mustill法官认为被告未能提供第18条下强加在他们身上的证据，因此最终作出对原告有利的判决。
在之前提过的CIF v.Sealink案中，关于不可抗力条款，商事法庭的Hirst法官在第590页判决中说，为了确立不可抗力，Sealink必须义不容辞去证明（i）没有履行对两艘首选船舶的光船租赁的义务是由于Sealink控制之外的情况造成的；（ii）Sealink必须证明他们本可以采取合理的举措来避免或减轻罢工及其后果。
In order to establish a force majeure situation it was incumbent on Sealink to prove: (i) that the non-fulfilment of the obligation to bare-boat charter the two first-choice vessels was due to circumstances beyond Sealink's control; and (ii) that Sealink had to show that there were no reasonable steps they could have taken to avoid or mitigate the strike and its consequences.
上诉院的Parker勋爵在327页判决书中说到，引援不可抗力，在绝大多数情况下，只能通过证明在法律上或实质上不可能。事实上，没有任何证据证明Sealink已经做了任何努力去为光船租赁合同提供了替代船。
（2）that in most cases that can only be done by showing either legal or physical impossibility.
(7) that there was in fact no evidence that they had made any effort to provide alternativeson bareboat charter.
在[2003] EWCA Civ 1031案中，Longmore勋爵在第13段判决中也引援了本文开头Parker勋爵所说的如下观点：
A party must not only bring himself within the clause but must show that he has taken all reasonable stepsto avoid its operation, or mitigate its results.
在GeneralConstruction Limited v. Chue Wing & Co Ltd and another [2013] UKPC 30案中，贵族院的Mance勋爵在第17段判决中说到：“合理”一词可以理解为仅仅表示缺乏过失就足以证明不可抗力的不可抗拒目的。原告接受没有过失或疏忽的行为与合理可行的行为标准有很大区别，被告没有过失或过错这一事实本身并不能证明他采取了一切措施，也就是说，合理可行的是合理的，实际上可以做到的；不可抗拒的概念包含了一个合理的，实际的可能性的标准，这就要求被告做的不仅仅是证明自己没有过失，相反，他必须进一步表明，一旦事件是可预见的，他就做了一切合理可行和切实可行的事情，而不仅仅是对他来说合理的做法。
17. The word "reasonable" might be read as suggesting that mere absence of faute is sufficient to demonstrate irresistibility for the purposes of force majeure. The appellant accepts that this is not so. In its written case before the Board, the appellant submits that standard is not to be regarded as "an absolute standard of impossibility". Rather itis, the appellant submits, the standard of a bon père de famille taking "those precautions which are reasonably and practicably possible in the circumstances of the case". For bon père de famille, the Board would itself substitute a "responsible crane operator". In its case, the appellant goes on expressly to accept, in this connection, that
"there is a very real difference between absence of faute or negligence and a standard of conduct referable to reasonable and practical possibility. The mere fact that a defendant has not been negligent or at faultdoes not of itself prove that he took all measures that were reasonably possible in the sense of being reasonably and practically available to him. In other words, a concept ofirresistibilité which incorporates a standard of reasonable and practical possibility still requires a defendant to do much more than prove that he was not negligent. On the contrary, he must go further and show that once the event was foreseeable he did everything which was reasonably possible and practicable, not only that which it might have been reasonable for him to do."
在第18段判决中，引援了Mustill法官在本案中所说，在一方面要求采取一切可能的预防措辞，一方面是按照审慎的现行做法合理行事。
Under article 17.2, Mustill J in JJ Silber at p. 247 identified the standard under article 17.2 as being"somewhere between,on the one hand, a requirement to take every conceivable precaution and, on the other hand, a duty to do no more than act reasonably in accordance with prudent current practice".
Mance勋爵认为，当飓风来袭时而把吊拆掉是非常愚蠢的做法。，即使时间似乎确实允许他们这么做。
On the evidence, it would have been very foolish to have been caught halfway through dismantling the crane when the cyclone struck.
The Board sees no reason why the crane operator should necessarily contemplate dismantling the crane merely because such a cyclone was predicted,even if time did appear to allow such dismantling.
结合这些判例，可以看出，如果合同中没有明显的例外条款，那么对于想引援不可抗力条款来免除责任的一方，必须负有举证责任，证明这些事件不可抗拒，同时要表明自己已经采取了一切合理的措施来避免或减轻其结果。这些措施如Mustill法官所说，必须是（i）不超越常识范围，（ii）不违法 及（iii）不明显无用的。换句话说，即一方不得要求另一方去做有违常识或违法或毫无用处的事。